Witnesssing Genocide: What Inhibits Intervention
Generally considered a twentieth century phenomenon, genocide has emerged as the pinnacle of all human rights tragedies upon garnering the attention of the United Nations in 1946. Two years later, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide formally established a definition for the term coined by Raphael Lemkin. Excusing any inherent flaws that various segments of the global community vociferously decry, the presence of a legal definition for genocide, and its recognition as a crime, reinforce both the legitimacy of the act and the threat it poses to humanity. In spite of this, instances of genocide have occurred since 1948, in developing and developed regions alike. In each instance, most of the world sat idle. In fact, it wasn’t until fifty years after the inception of the treaty that anyone would be convicted of genocide (Power, 60).
This essay will briefly elaborate on some of the reasons for silence in the face of genocide, whether it is the international community, collectively, or individual states possessing the resources and the moral compass to prevent genocide. Where possible, the analysis will include victim perspectives regarding why the international community remains silent. The issue under consideration is significant because genocide continues to be considered as a viable policy of governments throughout the world. Furthermore, there is little indication that the international community is capable of guarding against such actions. Each assumption revolves around the fact that the international community has remained silent as genocide has taken place.
Preventing genocide requires a willingness to intervene relatively early in the process. Often, early intervention is an inhibiting factor for most states, if not the international community as a whole. To intervene in the domestic affairs of another state is a blatant violation of respect for the principles of state sovereignty. In particular, high regard for state sovereignty, especially its own, has prevented the United States from even ratifying, let alone enforcing, the genocide treaty until 1988 (Power, 69). Since the establishment of the UN treaty in 1948, the United States has been a global superpower – eventually an uncontested hegemon – capable of singularly intervening in conflicts gravitating towards genocide. Nevertheless, U.S. leadership has been absent throughout this era of dominance because of the state’s strict adherence to the principles of state sovereignty. While this does not excuse other countries, the absence of the United States certainly deducts from both the capability and willingness of the international community to intervene when and where necessary. Furthermore, the economic and military clout of the United States poses a significant threat to potential perpetrators of genocide. As former Congressman William Proxmire stated: “The pressures of the greatest country in the world could make a wrongdoer think before committing genocide” (Power, 85).
Calls for the United States to increase its role in deterring genocide offer one solution to a worldwide problem that demands many more. Furthermore, recent history suggests that several countries are beginning to grow tired of the United States disregarding the United Nations and acting unilaterally on a number of issues. Lack of collective, decisive action by the international community, whether the United States leads or not, handcuffs intervention and perpetuates the trend of inaction, delayed action, or silence, as genocide occurs. This notion is echoed by the sentiments of Rwandan students themselves, some victims of genocide or the children of victims. Personal experiences left many with little confidence in the resolve or ability of the United Nations to intervene, and several of the interviewed students call on “multiple superpowers” to act independent of the United Nations and international organizations to exclusively prevent genocide (1000VoicesForum).
For many Rwandans, apprehension regarding the legitimacy and intentions of the global community, particularly the United Nations, stems from the absence of coordinated response against the genocide that occurred there in 1994. As victims of colonialism, Rwandans were for some time at the mercy of colonial powers that were responsible for the lopsided restructuring of Rwandan society. René Lemarchand clarifies this, explaining that colonizers in the mid-1950s proceeded to further manipulate the social environment in light of pressure from the UN Trusteeship Council to do so (Lemarchand, 485). Frequently, Belgian missionaries and colonial administrators intervened, sponsored coups, and mythologized the collective identities of the Hutu and Tutsi (Lemarchand, 486). As a result, it comes as no surprise when Rwandans blame the international community, and in particular the United Nations, for inaction during the 1994 genocide; a history of meddling by international organizations and colonial powers might have led many to expect similar intervention in light of the atrocities committed in 1994.
Given Rwanda’s colonial history, foreign interference in domestic affairs, and then inaction during the Rwandan genocide, present-day opinions surrounding the crisis demonstrate a belief that the developed states of the international community only consider intervention when it meets their strategic ends. Since Rwanda did not have anything desirable to the developed countries, the power-wielding elements of the international community chose to remain silent. Rwandan students have come to perceive the causes for this silence as the result of self-interest, a concept reinforced in the film Sometimes In April, where a scene showing a Hutu perpetrator calling the bluff of U.S. officials threatening action by insinuating that the United States would not intervene because Rwanda has nothing that the U.S. wants (Sometimes in April). The Rwandan students interviewed believed that United Nations peacekeeping forces were really in the country to protect foreign investors exploring natural resources to exploit (1000VoicesJournal). Whether true or not, the historical context and purposes of colonial presence in Rwanda, coupled with unmet expectations of intervention during a humanitarian crisis, leads many Rwandans to draw the conclusion that international inaction – international silence – stemmed from prioritizing self-interest over protecting human rights.
Often times, influential countries deride the vagueness of the definition of genocide to justify their inaction, masking the true reasons for their decision. Stuart Stein focuses on expert considerations of the definition of genocide as “insufficiently broad,” essentially fostering an environment for protracted debate and inaction, rather than decisive action (Stein, 1). For instance, those who opposed a U.S. response go genocides in Cambodia, Iraq, and Bosnia denied genocide on the basis that the casualty count, as a percentage of the group eliminated, was too low for the development to be considered genocide and warrant intervention (Power, 66). Therefore, the very definition of genocide can be manipulated by powerful countries, expected to be the vanguards of human rights globally, to remain silent for the purposes of their own self interest.
Legitimacy serves as yet another issue that excuses inaction during genocide. What if the perceived victims’ claims are not wholly accurate? What if the full details behind the atrocities are not disclosed? Foreign intervention on false pretenses could be embarrassing and potentially harmful. Deciphering accuracy from exaggeration can become particularly confusing when considering genocide that emerged as a result of political conflict. Dinesh D’Souza provides evidence that exaggerating the degree of violence for political gain can certainly be possible. D’Souza’s example is consequential because the formerly popular, now de-bunked genocide account he discusses, Rigoberta Menchu’s account of genocide in Guatemala, earned the eyewitness a Nobel Peace Prize. D’Souza discusses a study showing that “Rigoberta’s life story was ‘drastically revised’ to reflect the ideological perspective of a revolutionary left-wing organization she joined and on whose behalf she made the fateful tour of Europe that led to the publication of her book” (D’Souza, 2). Menchu’s falsified account presents a challenge to genocide-prevention efforts, particularly if D’Souza is correct when he states that Menchu’s reason for this was ideologically driven. There is little stopping politically or ideologically motivated individuals from falsely documenting accounts for the benefit of their respective cause. If instances such as this one become common, already apprehensive countries will likely become even more reluctant to intervene. Comparatively, officials could drown out pleas for intervention in the very same way many in Europe and the United States disregarded Raphael Lemkin’s appeals to rally the League of Nations into action at the outset of the Holocaust (refer to Power, Chapter 4).
The decision to intervene or not to intervene in instances of genocide is at the discretion of bystander nations or organizations with the resources to do so. Whether out of self-interest or in light of values, such as respecting the sovereignty of other nations, capable bystanders continually deflect responsibility to prevent or stop genocide as it has come to be defined at the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Simply put, bystanders maintain their own reasons for inaction, or silence. The bystander and student accounts documented in an online forum implicate specific bystanders, the developed nations and members of the United Nations Security Council, as acting out of self-interest insofar that since Rwanda had nothing to offer of economic significance, the powerful and influential countries remained silent. For the victims in Rwanda, this inaction is particularly shocking given the history of manipulative, interventionist tendencies of colonial powers over one-half century earlier. Going forward, bystanders may continue to choose inaction over intervention as new controversies develop pertaining to genocide. Debates over the issue of legitimacy of victim claims could enter the fray of an already crowded field of genocide-related debates, including the respect for sovereignty, opposition to U.S. unilateralism, and quantitative discrepancies over how many deaths constitute genocide.
Works Cited
D’Souza, Dinesh. “Fraudulent Storyteller Still Praised.” Weekly Standard Webzine. 1999, http://www.boundless.org/1999/departments/isms/a0000074.html, 1 – 3.
Jazimarba. “Re: Student Discussions – Please Post Here.” 28 April 2011. 1000 Voices Forum. http://judithanneseaman.com/simplemachinesforum/index.php?PHPSESSID=95arf2kopetgden9fo2rtnk1s5&topic=23.30.
Lemarchand, René. “The 1994 Rwanda Genocide.” Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views. Eds. Samuel Totten and William Parsons. New York, NY: Routledge. 1997, pp. 483 – 493.
Power, Samantha. “A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide.” New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers (2002).
Seaman, Judy. “Re: Student Discussions – Please Post Here.” 26 April 2011. 1000 Voices Forum. http://judithanneseaman.com/simplemachinesforum/index.php?PHPSESSID=95arf2kopetgden9fo2rtnk1s5&topic=23.15
Sometimes In April. Prod. Daniel Delume. Dir. Raoul Peck. Perf. Idris Elba, Oris Erhuero. HBO Films (2005).
Stein, Stuart D. “Genocide: Definition and Controversies.” University of the West of England. 26 December 2006. http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/gendef.htm.